A more significant flaw with the U.N. Rules of Engagement, however, is that they could leave U.N. forces in a highly vulnerable position. Under the ROE, U.N. forces cannot carry out offensive operations without specific approval; must use die minimum force necessary; can use their weapons only as a last resort; cannot retaliate; and must cease fire when an opponent ceases fire. Thus, hostile forces (usually Bosnian Serbs in this case) can ratchet up their provocation to just under the threshold beyond which UNPROFOR can use force. It is also possible that they could draw U.N. forces into a vulnerable position and then attack them. The resulting military and political loss could be heavy, along the lines of Beirut in 1983 and Somalia in 1993.
The underlying problem is that the ROE, which might work in a true peacekeeping operation, are being used in a situation in which there is no peace. The U.N. forces are expected to operate in the Bosnian countryside, securing safe areas, protecting civilians, and monitoring the opposing forces (see the section on "Cordon and Search Operations"). Yet, the ROE do not allow the forces the means to carry out such operations effectively or at an acceptable level of risk.
The UNPROFOR Rules of Engagement raise important questions concerning the ability of the United Nations to play a leading role in peacekeeping and whether the United States should commit U.S. military forces to operations governed by such rules. U.S. leaders have so far refused to commit ground forces to Bosnia, but they did commit troops to Somalia and have considered committing forces to U.N.-led operations in Haiti. It is also important to note that the United States, with its disproportionate weight in Security Council voting, bears a disproportionate responsibility for preventing the United Nations from adopting such ill-advised policies.
