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Report links CIA to military harsh interrogations

WASHINGTON – The brutal treatment of prisoners by the military at Guantanamo Bay, Iraq's Abu Ghraib prison and Afghanistan was systematic and a direct result of the CIA's early use of harsh interrogation tactics, according to a Senate report. The 232-page report released Tuesday by the Senate Armed Services Committee came less than a week after President Barack Obama released the Aug. 1, 2002 memo that justified the use of severe methods by the CIA.

The timeline laid out in the report shows, however, that military and CIA officers were being trained how to conduct coercive interrogations for as much as eight months before receiving the Justice Department green light. The CIA had started conducting severe interrogations in the spring of 2002.

Sen. Carl Levin, D-Mich., the committee's chairman, said the report shows that abuse of prisoners was sweeping and not, as former Bush administration defense official Paul Wolfowitz once said, the result of "a few bad apples." As the No. 2 defense official, Wolfowitz was a major architect of the Iraq war.

"Authorizations of aggressive interrogation techniques by senior officials resulted in abuse and conveyed the message that physical pressures and degradation were appropriate treatment," Levin said.

The Senate investigation has been in a Pentagon security review since Nov. 21, 2008. Its findings were drawn from more than 70 interviews and 200,000 pages of classified and unclassified documents.

"In my judgment," Levin said, "the report represents a condemnation of both the Bush administration's interrogation policies and of senior administration officials who attempted to shift the blame for abuse such as that seen at Abu Ghraib, Guantanamo Bay and Afghanistan to low-ranking soldiers."

According to the report, the road to the abuses began in December 2001, just three months after the Sept. 11 terror attacks. The Pentagon's general counsel office reached out that month to a military agency that trains American personnel in how to endure enemy interrogations.

The legal office wanted information about how the training unit, the Joint Personnel Recovery Agency, conducted mock interrogations and detention operations. The agency trains U.S. armed forces personnel to endure abusive treatment similar to methods used by North Korean, Communist Chinese and Vietcong interrogators.

In February 2002, President George W. Bush declared that the United States would not extend full Geneva Convention protections to al-Qaida and Taliban prisoners. He replaced that 60-year-old standard governing the treatment of prisoners with a new, untested guideline vaguely requiring only "humane treatment."

A month later, the CIA captured Abu Zubaydah, an alleged top al-Qaida organizer in Pakistan. Zubaydah proved resistant to traditional interrogation techniques. During the first half of 2002, CIA interrogators began to subject Zubaydah to waterboarding, a form of simulated drowning taught by survival school trainers to CIA personnel sometime in the first half of 2002.

In July 2002, responding to a follow-up from the Pentagon general counsel's office, JPRA officials detailed their methods, but warned that harsh physical techniques could backfire by making prisoners more resistant. They also cautioned about the reliability of information gleaned from the severe methods and warned that the public and political backlash could be "intolerable."

"A subject in extreme pain may provide an answer, any answer or many answers in order to get the pain to stop," the training officials said in their memo.

Less than a week later, the Justice Department issued two legal opinions that sanctioned the CIA's harsh interrogation program. The memos, one of which remained classified top secret until it was released by the Obama administration last week, appeared to draw deeply on the survival school data to show that the CIA's methods would not cross the line into torture, which was also newly defined.

The opinion concluded that the harsh interrogation methods would be acceptable for use on terror detainees because the same techniques did not cause severe physical or mental pain to U.S. military students who were tested in the government's carefully controlled training program.

Several people from the survival program objected to the use of their mock interrogations in battlefield settings. In an October 2002 e-mail, a senior Army psychologist told personnel at Guantanamo Bay that the methods are inherently dangerous and students are sometimes injured, even in a controlled setting.

"The risk with real detainees is increased exponentially," he said.

Nevertheless, for the next two years, the CIA and military officials received interrogation training and direct interrogation support from JPRA trainers.

By October 2002, military officials in the Pentagon and at Guantanamo Bay Naval Base had decided they needed tougher interrogations at the island prison. They crafted a plan that adopted some of the survival school methods — stress positions, food deprivation, shaving heads and beards, stripping prisoners naked, hooding them, exposing prisoners to extremes of heat and cold, and slamming them up against walls.

In December, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld approved 15 of those methods.

A month later, Rumsfeld's approvals for Guantanamo interrogations were put on hold while the matter underwent review inside the Pentagon. The delay was caused in large part because of the strenuous objections of the military services' top lawyers.

But according to the Senate report, the Rumsfeld memo had already made its way into the hands of special operations units based in Afghanistan. Military lawyers there saw the memo as permission to use the 'advanced techniques' on potential high-value prisoners. The Guantanamo methods were not supposed to be used at the island jail — but they were now deemed fair game in Afghanistan.

By February 2003, a special military unit preparing for the Iraq invasion obtained a copy of the Afghanistan interrogation policy that incorporated the techniques approved by Rumsfeld for Guantanamo. They changed the letterhead and adopted it wholesale for their own use in Iraq.

Subsequently, the interrogation officer in charge of Abu Ghraib obtained a copy of the special military unit's Iraq interrogation policy. She made minor changes — adding sensory deprivation and constraining sleep deprivation to 72 hours at a time — and submitted it through her chain of command.

Many of the procedures were adopted Iraq-wide in a memo issued in September 2003 by the Iraq war commander, Lt. Gen. Ricardo Sanchez.

According to the Senate report, lawyers for U.S. Central Command raised immediate concerns that the policy violated the Geneva Conventions, which applied to Iraq.

It would be a month before the policy was brought back under Geneva Convention guidelines. Despite the revision, the abuses at Abu Ghraib had already began.
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Report links CIA to military harsh interrogations
 
Commentary: Obama waffled on torture -- and looks weak
NEW YORK (CNN) -- Like so many politicians I have known, the man we elected president wants to be loved. He wants to be loved passionately and daily by the 69 million who voted for him and even some of the 60 million who voted for John McCain.

He wants to be loved by the Democrats on the Hill and even the Republicans who have still not given him any love.

He wants to be loved by the Europeans who have made a career out of badmouthing U.S. presidents and their policies.

The real example of searching for love in all the wrong places was last week's lovefest south of the border when, in effect, he appeared to be hugging Castro, Ortega and Chavez who have spent their lives fighting everything the United States stands for.

The problem, President Obama will find out as time goes on, is that he is not a rock star or a celebrity. He is certainly famous, and for the foreseeable future everyone will want to see him, touch him and hear him. But the job of president is about making choices. And right now he has the toughest job in the world at one of the toughest times in U.S. history. Every time he makes a choice, he will make the losing side mad.

This last week was the best example. The president decided, as he promised in the campaign, that he would ban torture -- a decision I agree with but many don't. Then he decided to release four Bush-era Justice Department memos that gave legal guidelines to the executive branch on "enhanced interrogation techniques."

Many wanted these documents released, and the president, after a month-long internal debate, gave them up. At the same time he said he had no intention of prosecuting the drafters of those memos or anyone else in a federal agency, mainly the CIA, who followed those guidelines.

The Right went nuts over the release of the documents. The CIA felt betrayed. The Left went nuts over the contents of the memos and pressed to have the authors -- high Justice Department officials in the Bush administration -- prosecuted, investigated and maybe even tortured! The president went to the CIA and gave them a cheerleading speech.

The next day he reversed himself and said it's up to Attorney General Eric Holder and the Congress to determine if any laws were violated by the former officials.

He waffled big time. Now all sides are mad at him and he looks weak. Weakness is the death knell for a president. With 1,366 days to go before this term is up, Obama's got to get tougher or he will be viewed as a personality who reads well from a teleprompter.

The president obviously knows the war on terror is not over. I imagine every morning when he gets the National Security briefing from the Director of National Intelligence, Dennis Blair, he takes a deep breath because he knows the world is not a very safe place.

Things aren't as simple as they were in the old days, when, for the most part, countries had conflicts with each other and they went to war wearing different-colored uniforms so you knew who your enemy was and where they might be found.

Fortunately, because of the enormous talents of many federal agencies comprised of extraordinary Americans who work very hard at their jobs, the United States has not been struck in 2,781 days. That was the day we all remember and always will remember as 9/11 -- when four aircraft hijacked by 19 al Qaeda terrorists crashed into the Twin Towers, the Pentagon and a field in Pennsylvania, killing 2,974 people.

On that day and the days that followed we felt a new sense of vulnerability and said, "never again." We know now in hindsight that our intelligence mechanism failed us in regard to the threat posed by al Qaeda. A lot of things were done in the days after that to gather intelligence and protect ourselves, our families and our neighbors.

We were playing under a new set of rules and in a way making it up as we went along. What I am trying to say is the CIA doesn't need to be handcuffed again or demoralized. It needs to know its mission.

Historically it has been an agency that has done a lot of heavy lifting. It has often also done the dirty work that other agencies didn't want to do. Some of it benefited this nation immensely and some may have hurt us abroad. But it has been an important element in battling the bad guys. It's now Obama's agency under the direction of his people and he has to earn its trust. His visit to the agency's headquarters in Langley, Virginia, and his speech to the employees was helpful, but only a first step.

Releasing the Justice memos opened a door and the contents repulsed many people. But these were not evil men who drafted the memos. These were not evil people who carried out the methods authorized by them. They were our fellow citizens who were trying to protect us from the real evildoers.

The president has got a lot on his plate. If his fellow Democrats in Congress want to try to impeach a federal appeals court judge who oversaw the memos and interrogate or prosecute former Justice Department lawyers, an attorney general or two and maybe a former vice president, then the battle will be drawn in the courtroom and in the political arena.

The losers will be us. All of us.
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WELL SAID COMMENTARY!
 
Senate report: Rice, Cheney OK'd CIA use of waterboarding

WASHINGTON (CNN) -- Top Bush administration officials gave the CIA approval to use waterboarding, a controversial interrogation technique, as early as 2002, a Senate intelligence report shows.

On July 17, 2002, national security adviser Condoleezza Rice, who later became secretary of state, said the CIA could proceed with "alternative interrogation methods," including waterboarding, when questioning suspected al Qaeda leader Abu Zubaydah.

The decision was contingent on the Justice Department's determining the method's legality. A week later, Attorney General John Ashcroft had determined the "proposed interrogation techniques were lawful," the report said.

The same techniques also were used in the interrogations of Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri, the first person charged in the United States in the 2000 attack on the USS Cole in Yemen that killed 17 U.S. sailors, and Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, the suspected mastermind behind the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States.

The release of the report, prepared by the attorney general's office at the request of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, details and declassifies the advice given to the CIA regarding its interrogation techniques.

The techniques again gained the endorsement of the Bush administration in spring 2003 when the CIA asked for a "reaffirmation of the policies and practices in the interrogation program."

In a meeting that included Vice President Dick Cheney, CIA Director George Tenet, Ashcroft, Rice and their legal counsels, "the principals reaffirmed that the CIA program was lawful and reflected administration policy," the report said.

President Obama has called waterboarding -- which simulates drowning -- torture and last week released a series of Bush-era memos on interrogation tactics.

One memo showed that CIA interrogators used waterboarding at least 266 times on Zubaydah and Mohammed.

In a 2008 interview with ABC, Cheney defended the practice of waterboarding, now banned by the Obama administration, particularly in the case of Mohammed.

"Did it produce the desired results? I think it did," Cheney said.

"Khalid Sheikh Mohammed ... provided us with a wealth of information. There was a period of time there, three or fours years ago, when about half of everything we knew about al Qaeda came from that one source.

"So it's been a remarkably successful effort," he said. "I think the results speak for themselves."

More recently, Cheney said some people are more interested in reading terrorists their rights than protecting the United States, a dig at the new administration.

Cheney this week called Obama's release of the Bush memos "disturbing" and said the administration is sitting on other CIA memos that show that the interrogations helped stop terror attacks.

"They didn't put out the memos that show the success of the effort, and there are reports that show specifically what we gained as a result of this activity," Cheney told Fox News on Monday. "They have not been declassified."
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More than ‘a few bad apples’

April 22: Janis Karpinski, the former Army brigadier general who was in command of Abu Ghraib, says on Countdown that soldiers were victims of scapegoating for merely obeying orders.


Countdown with Keith OlbermannCountdown with Keith Olbermann

Hearing ADers, could you please interpret what Janis says for ADers.
:ty:
 
Gruesome origins of 'torture' tactics overlooked
Officials failed to probe the history, efficacy of brutal interrogation methods

Waterboarding, which was used 266 times on Abu Zubaydah, left, and Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, right, had been prosecuted by the United States in war-crimes trials after World War II. It was a favorite of despotic governments since the Spanish Inquisition; one waterboard used under Pol Pot was even on display at the genocide museum in Cambodia.

WASHINGTON - The program began with Central Intelligence Agency leaders in the grip of an alluring idea: They could get tough in terrorist interrogations without risking legal trouble by adopting a set of methods used on Americans during military training. How could that be torture?

In a series of high-level meetings in 2002, without a single dissent from cabinet members or lawmakers, the United States for the first time officially embraced the brutal methods of interrogation it had always condemned.

This extraordinary consensus was possible, an examination by The New York Times shows, largely because no one involved — not the top two C.I.A. officials who were pushing the program, not the senior aides to President George W. Bush, not the leaders of the Senate and House Intelligence Committees — investigated the gruesome origins of the techniques they were approving with little debate.

According to several former top officials involved in the discussions seven years ago, they did not know that the military training program, called SERE, for Survival, Evasion, Resistance and Escape, had been created decades earlier to give American pilots and soldiers a sample of the torture methods used by Communists in the Korean War, methods that had wrung false confessions from Americans.

Even George J. Tenet, the C.I.A. director who insisted that the agency had thoroughly researched its proposal and pressed it on other officials, did not examine the history of the most shocking method, the near-drowning technique known as waterboarding.

'Perfect storm of ignorance'

The top officials he briefed did not learn that waterboarding had been prosecuted by the United States in war-crimes trials after World War II and was a well-documented favorite of despotic governments since the Spanish Inquisition; one waterboard used under Pol Pot was even on display at the genocide museum in Cambodia.

They did not know that some veteran trainers from the SERE program itself had warned in internal memorandums that, morality aside, the methods were ineffective. Nor were most of the officials aware that the former military psychologist who played a central role in persuading C.I.A. officials to use the harsh methods had never conducted a real interrogation, or that the Justice Department lawyer most responsible for declaring the methods legal had idiosyncratic ideas that even the Bush Justice Department would later renounce.

The process was "a perfect storm of ignorance and enthusiasm," a former C.I.A. official said.

Finger-pointing
Today, asked how it happened, Bush administration officials are finger-pointing. Some blame the C.I.A., while some former agency officials blame the Justice Department or the White House.

Philip D. Zelikow, who worked on interrogation issues as counselor to Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice in 2005 and 2006, said the flawed decision-making badly served Mr. Bush and the country.

"Competent staff work could have quickly canvassed relevant history, insights from the best law enforcement and military interrogators, and lessons from the painful British and Israeli experience," Mr. Zelikow said. "Especially in a time of great stress, walking into this minefield, the president was entitled to get the most thoughtful and searching analysis our government could muster."

After years of recriminations about torture and American values, Bush administration officials say it is easy to second-guess the decisions of 2002, when they feared that a new attack from Al Qaeda could come any moment.

If they shunned interrogation methods some thought might work, and an undetected bomb or bioweapon cost thousands of lives, where would the moral compass point today? It is a question that still haunts some officials. Others say that if they had known the full history of the interrogation methods or been able to anticipate how the issue would explode, they would have advised against using them.

Torture accusations

This account is based on interviews with more than two dozen current and former senior officials of the C.I.A., White House, Justice Department and Congress. Nearly all, citing the possibility of future investigations, shared their recollections of the internal discussions of a classified program only on condition of anonymity.

Leaked to the news media months after they were first used, the C.I.A.’s interrogation methods would darken the country’s reputation, blur the moral distinction between terrorists and the Americans who hunted them, bring broad condemnation from Western allies and become a ready-made defense for governments accused of torture. The response has only intensified since Justice Department legal memos released last week showed that two prisoners were waterboarded 266 times and that C.I.A. interrogators were ordered to waterboard one of the captives despite their belief that he had no more information to divulge.

But according to many Bush administration officials, including former Vice President Dick Cheney and some intelligence officers who are critics of the coercive methods, the C.I.A. program would also produce an invaluable trove of information on Al Qaeda, including leads on the whereabouts of important operatives and on terror schemes discussed by Al Qaeda. Whether the same information could have been acquired using the traditional, noncoercive methods that the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the military have long used is impossible to say, and former Bush administration officials say they did not have the luxury of time to develop a more patient approach, given that they had intelligence warnings of further attacks.

Michael V. Hayden, who served as C.I.A. director for the last two years of the Bush administration, devoted part of his last press briefing in January to defending the C.I.A. program. "It worked," Mr. Hayden insisted.

"I have said to all who will listen that the agency did none of this out of enthusiasm," he said. "It did it out of duty. It did it with the best legal advice it had."

When Mr. Bush assigned the C.I.A. with the task of questioning high-level Qaeda captives in late 2001, the agency had almost no experience interrogating the kind of hostile prisoners it soon expected to hold.

It had dozens of psychiatrists, psychologists, polygraphists and operations officers who had practiced the arts of eliciting information and assessing truthfulness. Their targets, however, were not usually terrorists, but foreigners offering to spy for the United States or C.I.A. employees suspected of misdeeds.

Agency officials, led by Mr. Tenet, sought interrogation advice from other countries. And, fatefully, they contacted the military unit that runs the SERE training program, the Joint Personnel Recovery Agency, which gives American pilots, special operations troops and others a sample of the brutal interrogation methods they might face as prisoners of war. Mr. Tenet declined to be interviewed.

By late 2001, the agency had contracted with James E. Mitchell, a psychologist with the SERE program who had monitored many mock interrogations but had never conducted any real ones, according to colleagues. He was known for his belief that a psychological concept called "learned helplessness" was crucial to successful interrogation.

Martin Seligman, a prominent professor of psychology at the University of Pennsylvania who had developed the concept, said in an interview that he was puzzled by Dr. Mitchell’s notion that learned helplessness was relevant to interrogation.

"I think helplessness would make someone more dependent, less defiant and more compliant," Dr. Seligman said, "but I do not think it would lead reliably to more truth-telling."

Still, forceful and brainy, Dr. Mitchell, who declined to comment for this article, became a persuasive player in high-level agency discussions about the best way to interrogate Qaeda prisoners. Eventually, along with another former SERE psychologist, Bruce Jessen, Dr. Mitchell helped persuade C.I.A. officials that Qaeda members were fundamentally different from the myriad personalities the agency routinely dealt with.

"Jim believed that people of this ilk would confess for only one reason: sheer terror," said one C.I.A. official who had discussed the matter with Dr. Mitchell.

Overwhelmed with reports of potential threats and anguished that the agency had failed to stop the Sept. 11 attacks, Mr. Tenet and his top aides did not probe deeply into the prescription Dr. Mitchell so confidently presented: using the SERE tactics on Qaeda prisoners.

Sinister 'brainwashing'
A little research on the origin of those methods would have given reason for doubt. Government studies in the 1950s found that Chinese Communist interrogators had produced false confessions from captured American pilots not with some kind of sinister "brainwashing" but with crude tactics: shackling the Americans to force them to stand for hours, keeping them in cold cells, disrupting their sleep and limiting access to food and hygiene.

"The Communists do not look upon these assaults as ‘torture,’ " one 1956 study concluded. "But all of them produce great discomfort, and lead to serious disturbances of many bodily processes; there is no reason to differentiate them from any other form of torture."

Worse, the study found that under such abusive treatment, a prisoner became "malleable and suggestible, and in some instances he may confabulate."

In late 2001, about a half-dozen SERE trainers, according to a report released Tuesday night by the Senate Armed Services Committee, began raising stark warning about plans by both the military and the C.I.A. to use the SERE methods in interrogations.

In December 2001, Lt. Col. Daniel J. Baumgartner of the Air Force, who oversaw SERE training, cautioned in one memo that physical pressure was "less reliable" than other interrogation methods, could backfire by increasing a prisoner’s resistance and would have an "intolerable public and political backlash when discovered." But his memo went to the Defense Department, not the C.I.A.

One former senior intelligence official who played an important role in approving the interrogation methods said he had no idea of the origins and history of the SERE program when the C.I.A. started it in 2002.

"The agency was counting on the Justice Department to fully explore all the factors contributing to a judgment about legality, including the surrounding history and context," the official said.

But it was the C.I.A. that was proposing the methods, and John Yoo, the Justice Department official who was the principal author of a secret August 2002 memorandum that authorized the interrogation program, was mostly interested in making a case that the president’s wartime powers allowed for the harsh tactics.

A persuasive case
After the March 28, 2002, capture in Pakistan of the Qaeda operative Abu Zubaydah — the C.I.A.’s first big catch after Sept. 11 — Mr. Tenet told Ms. Rice, then the national security adviser, he wanted to discuss interrogation, several former officials said. At a series of small-group and individual briefings attended by Mr. Bush, Mr. Cheney, Ms. Rice and Attorney General John Ashcroft, Mr. Tenet and his deputy, John McLaughlin, laid out their case.

They made a persuasive duo, former officials who heard their pitch recalled. Mr. Tenet, an extroverted former Congressional staff member, was given to forceful language about the threat from Al Qaeda, which he said might well have had operations under way involving biological, radiological or even nuclear weapons. Mr. McLaughlin, a career intelligence analyst, was low-key and cerebral, and some White House officials said they found his support for the methods reassuring.

In the briefings, Mr. Tenet said that after extensive research, the agency believed that only the methods he described — which he said had been used on thousands of American trainees — could extract the details of plots from hardened Qaeda fanatics.

"It was described as a program that was safe and necessary, that would be closely monitored by medical personnel," a former senior official recalled. "And it was very much in the context of the threat streams that were just eye-popping at the time."

Mr. Tenet’s descriptions of each proposed interrogation method was so clinical and specific that at one briefing Mr. Ashcroft objected, saying that cabinet officials should approve broad outlines of important policies, not the fine details, according to someone present. The attorney general later complained that he thought Mr. Tenet was looking for cover in case controversy erupted, the person said.

Ms. Rice insisted that Mr. Ashcroft not just pass along the conclusions of his Office of Legal Counsel, where Mr. Yoo worked, but give his personal assurance that the methods were legal under domestic and international law. He did.

The C.I.A. then gave individual briefings to the secretary of defense, Donald H. Rumsfeld, and the secretary of state, Colin L. Powell. Neither objected, several former officials said.

Mr. Cheney, whose top legal adviser, David S. Addington, was closely consulting with Mr. Yoo about legal justification, strongly endorsed the program. Mr. Bush also gave his approval, though what details were shared with him is not known.

With that, the C.I.A. had the full support of the White House to begin its harshest interrogations. Mr. Bush and Mr. Cheney have never publicly second-guessed their decision. Though some former officials expressed regret that such a momentous decision was made so quickly without vital information or robust debate, none were willing to be quoted by name.

One more check
There was one more check on intelligence programs, one designed in the 1970s to make sure independent observers kept an eye on spy agencies: Congress. The Senate and House Intelligence Committees had been created in the mid-1970s to prevent any repeat of the C.I.A. abuses unearthed by the Senate’s Church Committee.

As was common with the most secret programs, the C.I.A. chose not to brief the entire committees about the interrogation methods but only the so-called Gang of Four — the top Republican and Democrat on the Senate and House committees. The rest of the committee members would be fully briefed only in 2006.

The 2002 Gang of Four briefings left a hodgepodge of contradictory recollections that, to some Congressional staff members, reveal a dysfunctional oversight system. Without full staff support, few lawmakers are equipped to make difficult legal and policy judgments about secret programs, critics say.

Representative Nancy Pelosi of California, who in 2002 was the ranking Democrat on the House committee, has said in public statements that she recalls being briefed on the methods, including waterboarding. She insists, however, that the lawmakers were told only that the C.I.A. believed the methods were legal — not that they were going to be used.

By contrast, the ranking Republican on the House committee at the time, Porter J. Goss of Florida, who later served as C.I.A. director, recalls a clear message that the methods would be used.

"We were briefed, and we certainly understood what C.I.A. was doing," Mr. Goss said in an interview. "Not only was there no objection, there was actually concern about whether the agency was doing enough."

Senator Bob Graham, Democrat of Florida, who was committee chairman in 2002, said in an interview that he did not recall ever being briefed on the methods, though government officials with access to records say all four committee leaders received multiple briefings.

Senator Richard C. Shelby of Alabama, the senior Republican on the committee, declined to discuss the briefings.

Lawyer not briefed
Vicki Divoll, general counsel of the Senate Intelligence Committee in 2002 and a former C.I.A. lawyer, would have been a logical choice to advise senators on the legal status of the interrogation methods. But because of the restricted briefings, Ms. Divoll learned about them only years later from news media accounts.

Ms. Divoll, who now teaches government at the United States Naval Academy, said the interrogation issue revealed the perils of such restricted briefings.

"The very programs that are among the most risky and controversial, and that therefore should get the greatest congressional oversight," she said, "in fact get the least."

NYT: Origins of 'torture' tactics overlooked - The New York Times- msnbc.com

From 1st to 3rd pages in that article... It´s worth to read... *shake my head sadly*

Jiro, do you still deny it?


 
Liebling:-))) said:
More than ‘a few bad apples’

April 22: Janis Karpinski, the former Army brigadier general who was in command of Abu Ghraib, says on Countdown that soldiers were victims of scapegoating for merely obeying orders.


Countdown with Keith OlbermannCountdown with Keith Olbermann

Hearing ADers, could you please interpret what Janis says for ADers.
:ty:
Click to expand...

I will take care of a transcript when I get home this evening. My computer at work will not pull up the video.
 
Jiro said:
Senate report: Rice, Cheney OK'd CIA use of waterboarding
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I am laughing when I read part of the article...

Torture helps to keep America safe? What a joking!!! :laugh2: Look how people commit crimes including severe criminal, murders, rapes, etc and also accidents in everyday to compare with terrorists...

I would say lie to torturers to save my pain. Torture would NEVER get information because they would lie to save themselves.

:lol: Cheney is trying to save his skin and cover up war crime... :lol: :blah::blah::blah:

Give it up Cheney!
 
Liebling:-))) said:
I am laughing when I read part of the article...

Torture helps to keep America safe? What a joking!!! :laugh2: Look how people commit crimes including severe criminal, murders, rapes, etc and also accidents in everyday to compare with terrorists...

I would say lie to torturers to save my pain. Torture would NEVER get information because they would lie to save themselves.

:lol: Cheney is trying to save his skin and cover up war crime... :lol: :blah::blah::blah:

Give it up Cheney!
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crimes, murders, rapes are caused by 1 person... along with 1 or a few victims which cause a very very very very very tiny impact on America at macro level. But for terrorism - 1 terrorist can cause a devastating damage with a loss of hundreds, if not thousands of lives and a loss of millions (or billions) of dollars.

Please do not compare terrorists with criminals. it's like comparing an ax to chainsaw in terms of damage when destroying a forest. use your common sense.
 
Liebling:-))) said:
Jiro, do you still deny it?
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Deny what?

Just because you found something that agrees with your idea and I found something that agrees with my idea doesn't mean you or I are right. it depends on each one's moral view and thanks God the American government is not going by your moral view otherwise we would have crumbled a long time ago. That's a reason why we have a hardliner stance.

here's a question for you - Obama Administration released memos about torture. How come he didn't release the info about the results gained from interrogation? :hmm:

Whether the same information could have been acquired using the traditional, noncoercive methods that the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the military have long used is impossible to say, and former Bush administration officials say they did not have the luxury of time to develop a more patient approach, given that they had intelligence warnings of further attacks.

Michael V. Hayden, who served as C.I.A. director for the last two years of the Bush administration, devoted part of his last press briefing in January to defending the C.I.A. program. "It worked," Mr. Hayden insisted.

"I have said to all who will listen that the agency did none of this out of enthusiasm," he said. "It did it out of duty. It did it with the best legal advice it had."
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Jiro said:
Deny what?

Just because you found something that agrees with your idea and I found something that agrees with my idea doesn't mean you or I are right. it depends on each one's moral view and thanks God the American government is not going by your moral view otherwise we would have crumbled a long time ago. That's a reason why we have a hardliner stance.

here's a question for you - Obama Administration released memos about torture. How come he didn't release the info about the results gained from interrogation? :hmm:
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Probably because no useful information was gained.:giggle:

But seriously, Jiro....you should know that is classified information.

And, if they had of adhered to the laws of this country and the treatment of its prisoners, any information gained through such means would be inadmissable in a court of law.
 
jillio said:
Probably because no useful information was gained.:giggle:

But seriously, Jiro....you should know that is classified information.
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really????? funny.... and he released classified & sensitive memos to public... :hmm:
 
Jiro said:
really????? funny.... and he released classified & sensitive memos to public... :hmm:
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Those were not classified and sensitive. They were the truth of what happened and the role that Bush and his administration played in it.
 
jillio said:
And, if they had of adhered to the laws of this country and the treatment of its prisoners, any information gained through such means would be inadmissable in a court of law.
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and what laws apply to them? You should know that these terrorists are not tried under our criminal laws nor are not held at criminal courts.
 
Jiro said:
and what laws apply to them? You should know that these terrorists are not tried under our criminal laws nor are not held at criminal courts.
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That does not change the law of the land. And the fact that they were not being given due process was one of the problems at Gitmo. Where do you think the right to due process comes from?
 
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